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A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition
Carolyn Fischer, Thomas P. LyonAbstract: Ecolabels are widely used to inform markets about credence attributes of
products. We present the first analysis of ecolabel competition that allows labels to
have multiple tiers (e.g., silver/gold/platinum). For either an industry association or
an NGO sponsor in autarky, binary labels are preferred when a large enough share of
producers have a low cost of quality and when cost heterogeneity across firms is lim-
ited; multitier labels are preferred when a large enough share of producers have a high
cost of quality and when cost heterogeneity is substantial. The NGO implements
welfare-maximizing standards under certain conditions; the industry never does.
When sponsors with differing objectives compete, the unique equilibrium involves
multitier labels, with less environmental protection than the NGO in autarky would
provide. The multitier equilibrium is robust to endogenous entry by producers.
JEL Codes: D82, L15, L31, Q50
Keywords: ecolabels, certification, vertical differentiation, credence goods, NGOsGLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES such as biodiversity and climate change are
increasingly important to citizens around the world but are extremely difficult for gov-
ernments to address with standard policy tools. The globalization of trade and the
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462 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019for environmental problems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Global trade law also
makes it difficult for governments to attempt to regulate attributes of production pro-
cesses beyond their borders. In response, many groups (both industry trade associa-
tions and environmental advocacy groups) have put increasing effort into international
market mechanisms involving ecolabeling (Steering Committee 2012).
Ecolabels can be of two types: binary or multitiered. Binary labels establish a thresh-
old of performance and award a label to any product that meets or exceeds it. Binary
labels include Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification in timber products and
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification in seafood, as well as Fair Trade,
Rainforest Alliance, and Bird Friendly certifications, all competing in the coffee market.
Multitier labels establish a “ladder” of graduated performance levels and award differ-
ent labels depending on a product’s performance. Perhaps the best-known multitier
label is the US Green Buildings Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) certification for buildings, established in 1998, which offers certified, sil-
ver, gold, and platinum levels. LEED faces competition from a newer entrant, the Green
Globes program, established in 2005 by the Green Building Initiative, which also offers
four tiers that run from one to four “globes.” In addition, Sustainable Forestry Initiative
(SFI) certification, an industry-driven competitor to FSC, allows multiple tiers since
users can specify any percentage of certified content they desire, as long as they state it
clearly as part of their labeling.
Ecolabels also differ according to the sponsor of the label, with some offered by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) with a mission of environmental advocacy, and
others offered by industry trade associations. NGO labels include FSC and Rainforest
Alliance, while industry-backed labels include Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) cer-
tification for forest products and Green Globes for buildings.
Although there is a substantial theoretical literature on ecolabels, it has largely ig-
nored the possibility of multitiered labels, the possibility of strategic competition be-
tween labels, and the different objectives of NGO and industry sponsors. Fischer and
Lyon (2014) was the first paper to study strategic competition between labels and to
allow different objectives for NGO and industry sponsors. The present paper exam-
ines when each of these types of sponsors prefers to offer a binary label as opposed to a
multitier label and goes on to explore the nature of equilibrium when labels from both
types of sponsors compete. We seek to characterize the nature of the ecolabels that are
offered by each type of sponsor in equilibrium and to assess the impact of multitiered
labels and of label competition on overall environmental protection.1
We study credence goods, for which consumers cannot discern product quality on
their own, even after consumption, and hence rely on labels to provide information
about quality. We build on the standard duopolistic model of vertical product differ-
entiation, in which all consumers prefer higher-quality products but differ in their will-1. Li and van ‘t Veld (2015) explore similar issues under a quite different set of assumptions,
as we explain in more detail below.
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 463ingness to pay for quality. However, because markets in which ecolabeling is common
typically have many small producers rather than a duopoly, we allow for two classes of
price-taking firms, some with low costs of improving quality and some with high costs
of doing so. A multitier label creates incentive compatibility constraints that require label
sponsors to distort environmental standards if they wish to induce low-cost firms to
choose higher levels of performance. Consequently, from the perspective of either industry
profits or environmental performance, binary labels may be preferred to multitier labels.
Two different types of organization may sponsor labels: an NGO seeks to maximize
environmental benefits, while an industry trade association seeks to maximize the aggre-
gate profits of the industry. For either type of sponsor, labels can take one of three basic
forms. First, a single stringent standard can be set that can only be achieved by low-cost
firms. Second, a single weak standard can be set that can be met by all firms. Third, two
separate standards can be set, with the standard for low-cost firms distorted by the need
to ensure that they do not pool with the high-cost firms.
For either sponsor in autarky, the optimal label format depends upon the mix of
high-cost and low-cost firms, and the magnitude of the cost gap between them. How-
ever, we demonstrate that when the labels compete using multitier labels there exists a
unique equilibrium pair of standards, and competition always provides less environ-
mental protection than would the NGO in autarky.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the basic
model and its context within the literature, and exhibits the conditions for the exis-
tence of binary and multitiered labels. Section 2 characterizes the welfare-maximizing
label structure and the structure of optimal ecolabels for the NGO and the industry in
autarky. Section 3 presents the results for multitier competition between the two
sponsors. Section 4 shows the existence of Pareto-improving cooperative solutions.
Section 5 extends the model to allow for endogenously determined entry and shows
that our results continue to hold at the equilibrium level of entry. Section 6 discusses
our results in the context of the stylized facts about ecolabel proliferation, and section 7
concludes. Appendix A contains longer proofs, and an accompanying appendix B
(available online) analyzes the case of binary labels.
1. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND CONTEXT
We formulate a model with heterogeneous consumer preferences for ecolabel charac-
teristics and heterogeneous costs for meeting ecolabel standards, depending on a firm’s
type. The demand side of our model uses the standard vertical product differentiation
framework, in which all consumers prefer greener products but differ in their willing-
ness to pay for environmental quality.2 The supply side of our model, however, makes
some novel assumptions that depart from the standard vertical differentiation model.2. Mussa and Rosen (1978) originated this modeling framework. Unlike a representative
consumer model (Fischer and Lyon 2014), this structure implies that the demand for higher-
quality products depends on both their own price and the price of lower-quality substitutes.
464 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019In the canonical model, there are two firms with different costs of increasing product qual-
ity; the firms differentiate, with the high-cost firm offering a low-quality product and the
low-cost firm offering a high-quality product and earning higher profits (e.g., Lehmann-
Grube 1997). However, the actual markets in which ecolabeling is common—such as
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries—typically have many small producers rather than a du-
opoly. Thus, in our model we allow for two classes of firms, some with low costs of im-
proving environmental performance (“quality”) and some with high costs of quality, but
with many small price-taking firms in each class. Initially we assume that the number of
firms within each class is exogenously given, and we study the implications of varying the
mix of these two classes of firms. In section 5, we relax this assumption and allow for en-
dogenous entry.
Like many other papers, we treat environmental quality as a credence good, so con-
sumers are unable to discern the environmental attributes of a product on their own,
even after consumption. Hence they rely on ecolabels to provide information about
these attributes. Two different types of organization may offer ecolabels: an NGO seeks
to maximize environmental benefits, while an industry trade association seeks to max-
imize the aggregate profits of the industry.
Our focus on strategic ecolabel competition motivates some assumptions regarding
the certification industry that depart from some related strands of the literature. One
strand of the literature follows Lizzeri (1999), who assumes that certification bodies
seek to maximize their own profits, which leads them to set low standards and extract
all industry rents through high certification fees. In the case of ecolabels, however, this
seems to be sharply at odds with reality, where certification bodies are often nonprofit
organizations and chronically close to bankruptcy. Instead of assuming that certifica-
tion bodies maximize profits, we assume that they costlessly set standards that serve
the objectives of either NGOs or industry members. Another strand of the literature
focuses on the imperfect nature of certification, allowing for Type I errors (incorrect
rejection of a product that is truly green) and/or Type II errors (failure to reject a
product that is not truly green). Hamilton and Zilberman (2006) pursue this approach
in a setting with a monopolistic certification body and two quality options (green and
brown) where sellers may engage in fraud, that is, they allow for Type II errors. Mason
(2011) pursues the noisy certification approach in a setting with a monopolistic certi-
fication body and two quality options (green and brown), and allows for both Type I
and Type II errors. Harbaugh et al. (2011) study competition between exogenously set
standards enforced by error-prone auditors. Heyes et al. (n.d.) study competition be-
tween exogenously set standards when consumers must incur a cost to learn the mean-
ing of a label.While we believe it would be of interest to model the certification industry
in more detail, including the possibility of certification errors and the agency relation-
ship between certification bodies and auditors (as in Lerner and Tirole 2006), we leave
this task for future work, opting instead to focus on the implications of strategic com-
petition between standard-setting bodies that have differing objectives in a setting
where there is a continuum of possible quality options.
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 465This paper builds on the prior work of Fischer and Lyon (2014), which was the
first paper to study strategic competition between two certification bodies with differ-
ing objectives. That paper, however, allowed each certification body to set only binary
standards, so it assumed away the issue that takes center stage here, namely, the in-
centives of certification bodies to choose between binary and multitiered standards.
It also employed rather different models of demand and supply, using a simple repre-
sentative consumer model based on that in Heyes and Maxwell (2004) and a contin-
uum of firms with differing costs of quality. We believe the modeling choices we make
in the present paper provide a better setting for exploring multitiered labels. The sim-
pler treatment of the supply side of the model (two types instead of a continuum) al-
lows us to obtain explicit results for strategic multitier competition in a more nuanced
model of demand. At the same time, we maintain the focus on the competition be-
tween NGO-led and industry-led ecolabels. (It is worth noting that although we as-
sume two types of firms instead of a continuum, our basic results for binary label com-
petition are qualitatively similar to Fischer and Lyon [2014], providing assurance that
our results are not an artifact of this modeling simplification. More details about this
comparison can be found in n. 12 below.)
There are to our knowledge only two other papers that examine vertical quality
competition between standards.3 Poret (forthcoming) studies binary label competition
between two NGOs with objective functions that differ in the emphasis they place
on label stringency and quantity of labeled products sold. She finds that the two labels
can coexist in the market only when their objectives are highly differentiated and their
choices of quality are strategic substitutes. She also finds that competition causes the
NGOwith the more stringent standard to lower it, but increases overall environmental
improvement. Like us, Li and van ’t Veld (2015) study strategic competition between
NGO and industry ecolabels in a context with heterogeneous consumer preferences.
However, they make some very different assumptions that lead to very different results.
Most importantly, they assume that all firms have the samemarginal production cost of
producing an environmentally friendly product. As a result, all firms are indifferent be-
tween labels of varying stringency, and the industry association has no preferences re-
garding competition or the number of tiers offered by labeling schemes as long as at
least one standard is set at the level that maximizes the green market’s size. The authors
find that NGO labels and industry labels always coexist in the market. However, when
they study competition between labels, they limit themselves to binary labels, as in Fi-
scher and Lyon (2014). Thus, our paper is the first to obtain results on competition
between certifiers offering multitiered labels.3. Heyes and Martin (2016) study competition between labels that choose an “issue” (a po-
sition on a circle) and then set label stringency; however, each label addresses a different issue, so
labels do not compete on the vertical dimension within a given issue.
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We consider two quality levels for the ecolabel standards: a basic level, sB and a more
ambitious level sA > sB. To represent the demand for ecolabel stringency, let consum-
ers have utility u 5 ms – p, with m ∈ ½0, 1 distributed according to density function
f (m). Then we can find the consumer at mB who is indifferent between buying the
product with the basic ecolabel and not buying at all:
mBsB – pB 5 0:
Next we identify the consumer at mA who is indifferent between the two qualities:
mAsA – pA 5 mAsB – pB:










Assuming f (m) is uniform on [0, 1], then f (m) 5 1, and as shown in figure 1 there are
three groups of consumers. Consumers with the lowest taste for quality do not buy an
ecolabeled product, and their aggregate demand isFigure 1. Consumer demand. WTP 5 willingness to pay




Consumers with the highest taste for quality purchase the high-quality product, and
their aggregate demand is




Finally, consumers with a moderate taste for quality purchase the low-quality product,











Note that in the case of a single, binary label with standard sU and price pU, con-
sumer demand is




Figure 1 portrays the division of consumer demand among the labeled and unlabeled
products.1.2. Firms
On the supplier side of the market, there areN price-taking firms, each producing one
unit of the product with environmental damage Z. Firms can take measures to reduce
their environmental damages, with damages falling to Z – s if the firm undertakes
measures of stringency s. We will limit our analysis to cases where s ≥ 0.
The firms are of two types, based on their costs of meeting the label requirements.
Two-type models are, of course, common in the literature on information economics
and typically provide the main insights associated with continuous-type models but in
much crisper form (Rasmusen 2006). However, the two-type assumption is also a
plausible representation of the certification world. For example, Delmas et al. (2004)
suggest that the cost of becoming an FSC-certified lumber supplier depends largely upon
whether the supplier is already sophisticated enough to offer “whole system” home
building solutions to buyers or not, a binary distinction.
For a firm of type i, the cost of adopting a label of stringency s j is vi (s j)2. Thus, costs
are quadratic in label stringency and the marginal cost of quality is 2vis j. Profits for firm i
pursuing label j are the revenues p j minus these costs:
pij 5 p j – vi s j
 2
:
468 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019There areNA firms with low cost parameter vA that are better suited to pursue the
ambitious standard and NB firms (having higher costs vB > vA) that are better suited
for the basic label. (We make the matching between firms and standards precise be-
low.) Let N 5 NA 1 NB. Our market scale for the certified market is such that
N < 1, since the distribution of consumers sums to 1.1.3. Price Determination
If standards are set in such a way that the two types of firms prefer different labels,
then in equilibrium supply equals demand, so that NA 5 DA and NB 5 DB. We
can then work backwards to solve for prices as a function of the standards. First,
we obtain the price for the basic standard. From N 5 DA 1 DB 5 1 – pB/sB, we
obtain
pB 5 sB(1 – N): (3)
Note that this price is a function of the basic standard alone and does not depend on
the ambitious standard.
Next, we solve for the price associated with the ambitious standard. Setting
NA 5 DA and substituting in for pB we obtain
pA 5 sA(1 – NA) – sBNB: (4)
Note that the price of the ambitious label is decreasing in the standard for the basic
label, since they compete with one another. Now we can compute profits. The profit
of a high-cost firm meeting standard sB is
pBB 5 pB – vB sB
 2
5 sB(1 – N) – vB sB
 2
and the profit of a low-cost firm meeting standard sA is
pAA 5 pA – vA sA
 2
5 sA(1 – NA) – sBNB – vA sA
 2
:
1.4. Conditions for a Multitier Equilibrium
The foregoing discussion assumes that the standards are such that a separating equi-
librium exists in which the two types of firms prefer different labels. To characterize
when this occurs, let us define the maximum single standard (i.e., when the other
standard is absent; subscript E indicates that this is the most environmentally friendly
standard possible) that generates nonnegative profits for each firm type:
sBE ≡ (1 – N)/v
B;
sAE ≡ (1 – N
A)/vA > sBE:
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 469Other useful points of reference are the single standards that maximize profits for each






E /2 > s
B
p:
For each firm type there are two constraints: (1) individual rationality (IR), which
requires that profits be nonnegative, and (2) incentive compatibility (IC), which re-
quires that profits be higher with the firm’s own standard than with the other type’s
standard, given the prevailing prices.
In a multitier equilibrium, for low-cost firms to adopt the ambitious standard, the
IR constraint requires pAA ≥ 0, or sA ≤ sAE , and the IC constraint for an individual
type A firm (“ICA constraint”) requires pAA ≥ pAB 5 pB – vA(sB)2, which reduces
to
sA ≤ sAICA(s
B) ≡ sAE – s
B,
implying a one-to-one trade-off as sB is increased.
In a similar fashion, in order for high-cost firms to adopt the basic standard, the IR
constraint requires pBB ≥ 0 or sB ≤ sBE and the IC constraint for an individual type B
firm (“ICB constraint”) requires pBB ≥ pBA 5 pA – vB(sA)2, which reduces to
sB ≥ sBICB(s
A) ≡ (1 – NA)/vB – sA:
It will sometimes be convenient to write this in terms of an “exclusionary standard”
sAx (sB) that is just high enough to exclude a high-cost firm from opting for the ambi-
tious standard, given sB:
sA ≥ sAx (s
B) ≡ (1 – NA)/vB – sB:
Note that if the high-cost firms have nonnegative profits with the basic standard,
then a fortiori the low-cost firms would have positive profits with that standard
(pAB > pBB ≥ 0); if the incentive compatibility constraint is met for the low-cost
firms, then their individual rationality constraint is automatically satisfied, that is,
pAA ≥ pAB > pBB ≥ 0. Thus, in an equilibrium with two standards, four constraints
must be met:
1. 0 ≤ sB ≤ sA,
2. sB ≤ sBE,
3. sB ≥ sBICB(s
A),
4. sA ≤ sAICA(s
B).
470 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019It will be helpful in later sections to know whether the ICA and ICB constraints
can both bind simultaneously, as is addressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The ICA and ICB constraints cannot bind simultaneously.
Proof: If sA 5 sAICA(s
B)5 sAE – s
B, then sB 5 (1 – NA)/vA – sA > (1 – NA)/vB –
sA 5 sBICB(s
A). Similarly, if sB 5 sBICB(s
A) 5 (1 – NA)/vA – sA, then sAE – s
B 5
(1 – NA)/vA – (1 – NA)/vA 1 sA > sA. QED2. AUTARKY POLICIES
We begin our analysis by characterizing the welfare-maximizing set of ecolabels, after
which we characterize the preferred labeling standards when each certifying body can
set them on their own, without threat of competition. We show that for each label
sponsor—social planner, NGO, or industry—a simple binary label is preferred to a
multitiered label under certain conditions on industry structure. However, the circum-
stances under which one or the other is preferred differ greatly depending on the ob-
jectives of the label sponsor.
Since the NGO maximizes environmental protection and the industry maximizes
aggregate profits, one might expect the welfare-maximizing set of standards to fall
strictly in between the NGO and the industry standards. However, as we will show,
there is a range of conditions under which the NGO actually implements the welfare-
maximizing set of standards.2.1. Social Welfare Maximum
Social welfare consists of the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and environ-




(msB – pB)f (m)dm 1
ð1
mA
(msA – pA)f (m)dm:
5





sA – pBNB – pANA,
where we are making use of (1), (2), (3), (4), and our assumption that f(m) is uniform.
With a single basic standard CS(sB, sB) 5 N½2 – NsB/2 – NpB and with a single am-
bitious standard CS(sA, 0) 5 NA(2 – NA)sA/2 – pANA.
Environmental gains are
G(sA, sB) 5 NAsA 1 NBsB,
and industry profits are










sB(1 – N) – vB sB
 2
:
In the remainder of the paper, we will sometimes suppress the dependence of these
measures on sA and sB when there is no risk of confusion.
A social planner would choose sA and sB < sA to maximize welfare W 5 CS1
G 1 P, subject to the IC and IR constraints. Simplifying, welfare is consumer utility
net of costs, plus environmental gains:
W 5









1 NAsA 1 NBsB:
This welfare function is strictly increasing in sA up to and beyond sAE .
4 Thus, the
planner will want to set the ambitious standard as high as possible, meaning sA * 5 sAE
for a single ambitious standard and sA * 5 sAICA for a differentiated multitier standard.
Since the ICA constraint binds, the ICB constraint cannot.
Similarly, given sA, welfare is strictly increasing in sB up to and beyond sBE.
5 Thus,
the planner will also want to set the basic standard as high as possible. This means
sB * 5 sBE for a single basic standard. For a multitier standard with the ICA constraint
binding, the planner will need to balance the benefits of raising sB with the costs of
lowering sA.
The following proposition characterizes the structure of the welfare-maximizing
standard. The proof begins by showing that the incentive compatibility constraint
for the low-cost firms always binds, so the other constraints do not. Hence, for a multi-
tiered solution, the problem simply becomes choosing the optimal basic standard,
which can be shown to be
sBW 5
N(4 – N) – 2NA(2 1 NA)
4Nv
,
where v ≡ (NAvA 1 NBvB)/N. The remainder of the analysis involves properly ac-
counting for the relevant constraints and involves the following expressions:64. Evaluating ∂W/∂sA 5 NA(4(1 – sAvA) – NA)/2 at sA 5 sAE yields 3(N
A)2/2 > 0.





1 1 2N – N2/2
p
– 1; ΘICA 5 (1 – NA)/(2(1 – N)); ΘMT1W 5 (3N2 –
2NA(2N1NA))/(4NA(1 – N)); ΘBinaryW 5 (1/2) 1 (½N(2 1 N) – x/½4NA(1 – N)), where
x 5
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
N4 1 4N2(1 – NA 1 (NA)2 1 N(1 – NA)) 1 8NA((NA)2(1 1 NA) 1 N(1 – NA)) – 12(NA)2
q
; and
ΘMT2W must be solved numerically.





• ΘMT1W (where sBW 5 s
B
E),















E , 0)), and
• NAW (defining where s
B
W 5 0).
Proposition 1: The welfare-maximizing standard depends upon the market share
of low-cost firms in the certified market and their cost advantage relative to high-
cost firms. A single standard is optimal if the number of low-cost firms in the cer-
tified market is high (NA > NAW): it will be an ambitious standard of {s
A
E , 0} if costs





otherwise. If the number of low-cost firms in the certified market is low (NA < NAW)
then sB > 0 and sA 5 max½sAICA(sB), sB. In this case, if the cost advantage of the





E} is optimal. If the cost advantage of the low-cost firms is in the range
ΘMT1W < v
A/vB < ΘMT2W , then a multitier standard with sB 5 sBW ∈ (0, s
B
E) holds.
Otherwise, a single basic standard of {sBE, s
B
E} is optimal.
Proof: See appendix A. QED
Intuitively, the single ambitious standard is preferred when low-cost firms dominate
the certified market, and it is set at the highest level possible consistent with participa-
tion by the low-cost firms. The exception is when cost differences are small enough that
a small reduction in the standard to the maximum achievable by the high-cost firms
brings in more benefits with full participation. When high-cost firms dominate the cer-
tified market, a multitier standard is optimal unless the two types of firms have similar
costs, in which case a differentiated standard cannot be supported and a single basic
standard is used. As the share of ambitious firms gets larger, it may be optimal to in-
crease the differentiation among standards, asking less than the maximum from the
high-cost firms in order to ask more from the low-cost firms.
Figure 2 presents the welfare-optimal standards for the case ofN 5 1/2; results are
qualitatively similar for smaller values of N. When low-cost firms dominate the certi-
fied market (i.e., whenNA/N > NAW/N 5 :7386), a single ambitious standard is pre-
ferred if costs are sufficiently differentiated (vA/vB < ΘBinaryW , shown in the dark gray
area). When the mix of low-cost and high-cost firms is more balanced and low-cost
firms have a significant cost advantage (i.e., vA/vB < ΘMT2W ) a multitier standard with
an optimized sBW is preferred (the white area).When high-cost firms dominate themar-
ket and low-cost firms have enough of a cost advantage (i.e., vA/vB < min½ΘICA,ΘMT1W ),




E) is chosen (as seen in the light gray
area). Regardless of the mix of firms, if the cost differential between the two types is
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 473sufficiently small, then a single basic standard is optimal (shown in the medium gray
area).
As the size of the certified market grows larger, the region where the single basic
standard is preferred shrinks and eventually disappears altogether. Figure 3 presents
the case ofN 5 2/3. The basic logic of the previous figure remains, but here the single
basic standard is never optimal. A single ambitious standard is optimal when low-cost
firms dominate, an interior multitier standard is optimal when the mix of low-cost and





optimal if high-cost firms dominate.Figure 2. Welfare optimum (N 5 1/2)Figure 3. Welfare optimum (N 5 2/3)
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The NGO’s objective is to maximize total environmental gains:
G 5 NAsA 1 NBsB:
To maximize G the NGO wants to set both standards as high as possible, subject to
the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints (that sB ≤ sBE and
sA ≤ sAICA 5 s
A
E – s
B). Thus, there are three options for the pair {sA, sB}:7
1. {sAE , 0}, a single ambitious standard that can only be met by low-cost
firms;




E}, a multitier standard; or
3. {sBE, s
B
E}, a single basic standard in which both types participate.
These bear a strong resemblance to the set of possible welfare optima. In particular,
the incentive compatibility constraint binds at an interior solution. Intuitively, the first
option is chosen when theNGOdoes not wish to dilute the ambitious standard (which
is necessary to meet the ICA constraint) by offering a lower-tiered standard. The sec-
ond, multitier strategy requires market conditions that support a differentiated stan-
dard (namely, a large enough cost differential). The third strategy of a single basic stan-
dard occurs when the multitier standard is not supported and the NGO prefers this
binary standard over the ambitious one.
We present the NGO’s optimal standard in the next proposition.
Proposition 2: The NGO’s optimal standard in autarky depends upon the share of
the overall market that is certified, the market share of the low-cost firms, and the
cost advantage of the low-cost firms. If less than 2/3 of the market is certified
(N < 2/3) and the majority of firms have low costs (NA/N < 1/2), then the
NGO prefers a single ambitious standard of sAE if low-cost firms have a large cost
advantage (vA/vB < ΘBinaryN ) and a single basic standard of s
B
E otherwise. If less
than 2/3 of the market is certified and the majority of firms have high costs, then




E) if low-cost firms have a large
cost advantage (vA/vB < ΘICA) and a single basic standard of (sBE, s
B
E) otherwise.
If at least 2/3 of the market is certified, then the NGO prefers a single ambitious






Proof: See appendix A. QED7. Note that the NGO would be happy to have the high-cost firm want to adopt the more
ambitious standard, so the sBICB constraint is not a concern. Note also that the gains are linear in
abatement and recall that ∂sAICA/∂s
B 5 –1, so there can be no interior solution with 0 < sB < sBE
and sA 5 sAICA.
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 475The possible equilibria are illustrated graphically in figures 4 and 5, which show how
the set of equilibria changes as the ratio NA/N increases. In particular, we illustrate
separately the cases with three equilibria (we show the example ofN 5 1/2, but the fig-
ure is qualitatively similar for any N < 2/3) and with two equilibria (when N ≥ 2/3).
The reason for the dependence onN is that the boundary conditions on vA/vB determin-
ing when a single basic standard is preferred to the alternatives change with N.
The optimal NGO label for the case where N 5 1/2 is illustrated in figure 4.
When both types of firms have similar costs, a single basic standard that pushes the
high-cost firms to their participation constraint is used.When low-cost firms dominate
the certifiedmarket and have amore substantial cost advantage, a single ambitious stan-
dard that pushes the low-cost firms to their participation constraint is preferred.WhenFigure 4. NGO optimum (N 5 1/2)Figure 5. NGO optimum (N 5 2/3)
476 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019high-cost firms dominate the certified market but have significantly higher costs than
the type A firms, a multitier standard is used in which the high-cost firms are at their
participation constraint and the low-cost firms are at their incentive constraint.
As mentioned above, if overall industry size is large enough, the NGO’s strategy
shifts distinctly. As the number of firms in the certified market grows, the value to
the NGO of setting the single basic standard diminishes until at N ≥ 2/3, it is dom-
inated by one of the two other options. This case is illustrated in figure 5, where the
border lines for ΘICA and Θ
Binary
N are no longer visible. Now the NGO simply chooses






E). The multitier standard dominates the single ambi-
tious standard when NA < N/2.
2.3. Industry Standards
Consider now the industry’s behavior when it is free to set its own standards without
competition from the NGO. The industry trade association’s objective is to maximize
the total profits of all firms:
P 5 NA





sB(1 – N) – vB sB
 2
:
As was true for the NGO, the industry has three basic options for the pair {sA, sB}:
1. {sA, 0}, a single ambitious standard that can only be met by low-cost
firms;
2. {sA, sB}, a multitier standard; or
3. {sB, sB}, a single basic standard in which both types participate.
Note that, unlike the case with the social planner or the NGO as a label sponsor,
there is no guarantee that the low-cost firms’ incentive compatibility constraint binds.
We begin our analysis of this case by showing that the industry, unlike the other two
sponsors, never wants to have all firms certify to a single basic standard.
Lemma 2: In autarky, the industry never prefers an equilibrium in which both firm
types certify to the same standard.
Proof: Consider a standard in which both types certify to the single basic standard
sB. With both types participating, joint profits are
PSB 5 N s
B(1 – N) – v sB
 2 
,





A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 477However, the industry can necessarily raise profits for both types of firms if it offers
{sAp , sBp}. High-cost firms prefer sBp to sBP, and their profits are unaffected by the am-
bitious standard. Low-cost firms prefer sAp > sBP, and they also prefer that high-cost
firms face a standard sBp < sBP, since a lower standard for the B firms raises prices for
A firms. To the extent that the industry then deviates from {sAp , sBp}, it must be that
it further raises joint profits. QED
Thus, the industry always chooses either a single ambitious standard that excludes
the high-cost firms or a multitier standard. A single ambitious standard that cannot be





sA(1 – NA) – vA sA
 2
:
If the industry chooses a single ambitious standard, it must take into account
the ICB constraint to ensure that it does not inadvertently set a single basic standard
that both types of firms can meet. In other words, it must choose between the profit-
maximizing standard for ambitious firms, sAp , and the exclusionary standard that keeps






A bit of calculation shows that the single ambitious standard is set at sAp if
vA/vB < 1/2 and at sAx (0) if vA/vB > 1/2.
9
The industry’s other option is a multitier standard. Interestingly, the combination
comprising the two standards that are optimal for the two types of firms individually is
never the optimal multitier strategy for the industry. The logic is similar to that in tra-8. For a high-cost firm to be unwilling to participate in the ambitious standard, it must be
that pA – vB(sA)2 < 0. If this condition holds for sAp (and the associated pA 5 sAp (1 – NA) that
would obtain if no B’s participated), then if the industry opts for the ambitious standard it will
simply choose sAp . On the other hand, if sAp (1 – NA) – vB(sAp )
2 > 0, then the industry must raise
the ambitious standard above sAp if it wants to exclude participation by high-cost firms. In the
absence of a basic standard, the ambitious standard that just leaves the profit of a high-cost firm
at zero (given that sB 5 0) is sAx (0). Note that sAx (0) 5 (1 – NA)/vB > (1 – N)/vB 5 sBE. The
difference exists because sBE is the standard at which high-cost firms earn zero profits if all of
them certify to the standard, whereas sAx is the standard at which a single high-cost firm earns
zero additional profits if it is the only one to certify to the ambitious firms’ standard.
9. It is easy to see that sAx > sAp if (1 – NA)/vB > (1 – NA)/2vA, or vA/vB > 1/2. Thus, if
the industry chooses a single ambitious standard it is set at sAp if vA/vB < 1/2 and sAx (0) if
vA/vB > 1/2.
478 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019ditional vertical differentiation models: profit maximization creates pressures to distort
the basic standard downward in order to relax price competition (Shaked and Sutton
1982; Ronnen 1991).
Thus, in the industry autarky case, the only relevant constraints regard the basic
standard. Not only can it not fall below zero, but the ICB constraint may also limit
how much the basic standard can be lowered, and also require the ambitious standard
to rise to maintain separation. If the ICB constraint does not bind, the low-cost firms
will get their unconstrained profit-maximizing standard; as shown in lemma 1, if the
ICB constraint does bind, the ICA constraint cannot. Neither IR constraint will bind,
since the standards are strictly below their maximums.
Proposition 3 characterizes the industry’s optimal strategy in autarky, making use
of the following threshold values:
• ΘMT1I 5 (1 – NA)/(1 1 NB), the relative cost at which the ICB con-
straint is just nonbinding with a multitier standard (λICB 5 0); and
• ΘMT2I 5 1 – N(1 – N)/(2(1 – NA)NA), the relative cost at which the
ICB-constrained interior solution has no basic standard (sBI 5 0).
• (sAx (0) 5 sAp ), which defines the relative cost at which the exclusionary
standard just equals the profit-maximizing standard for the ambitious
firms;
• NA 5 1 – N, the market share at which the unconstrained basic stan-
dard is nonpositive (sBp – NA/(2vB) 5 0).
Proposition 3: The industry’s optimal standard in autarky depends upon the mar-
ket share of low-cost firms and the cost advantage of low-cost relative to high-cost
firms. If low-cost certified firms have a smaller market share than uncertified firms
(NA < 1 – N), the industry prefers a multitier standard. In this case, if low-cost
firms have a large cost advantage (vA/vB < ΘMT1I ), then the industry prefers a multi-
tier standard of (sAp , sBp – (NA/2vB)), but if low-cost firms have a small cost advan-
tage (vA/vB > ΘMT1I ), then the industry prefers a multitier standard of (sAp1
(λICB/2NAvA), sBICB). If low-cost certified firms have a larger market share than
uncertified firms (NA > 1 – N) and their cost advantage is large (vA/vB < 1/2),
then the industry prefers a single ambitious standard of (sAp , 0). If low-cost certified
firms have a larger market share than uncertified firms and their cost advantage
is moderate (vA/vB ∈ ½1/2,ΘMT2I ), then the industry prefers a single ambitious
standard of (sAx , 0). If low-cost certified firms have a larger market share than uncer-
tified firms and their cost advantage is small (vA/vB ∈ (ΘMT2I , 1), then the indus-
try prefers a multitier standard of (sAp 1 (λICB/2NAvA), sBICB).
Proof: See appendix A. QED
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 479The optimal standards are illustrated in figures 6 and 7. Note that the ambitious
standard is always set at or above its autarkic profit-maximizing level, while the basic
standard is always distorted downward from its individually profit-maximizing level in
order to reduce competition with the ambitious firms.
Figure 6 presents the case of N 5 1/2, so NA 5 (1 – N) at NA/N 5 1. In this
case (and for any N < 1/2), the industry always chooses a multitier standard, and
the only question is whether the ICB constraint is binding. For vA/vB < ΘMT1I , the
ICB does not bind and for vA/vB > ΘMT1I it does. AlthoughΘ
MT2
I and the curve where
sAx (0) 5 sAp are listed in the legend, they are not applicable for these parameter values,
as indicated by the “n.a.” in parentheses beside them.Figure 6. Industry optimum (N 5 1/2)Figure 7. Industry optimum (N 5 2/3)
480 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019Figure 7 presents the case of N 5 2/3, so NA 5 (1 – N) at NA/N 5 1/2. As
lemma 2 stated previously, the industry association never wants to set a single standard
to which both types would adhere. However, as the figure shows, if there are enough
ambitious types and costs are sufficiently dispersed, the industry may prefer to set only
a single ambitious standard, which it does to avoid eroding any profits for the low-cost
firms, even with a modest basic standard for the high-cost firms. If the ambitious mar-
ket segment is larger than the uncertified segment, and the A firms have substantially
lower costs than the B firms, then the industry sets a single ambitious standard that
only the A firms can meet. When vA/vB < 1/2, the industry is unconstrained and this
standard is sAp ; for a small range where vA/vB > 1/2, the industry raises the ambitious
standard above sAp to exclude the high-cost firms. Otherwise the industry offers a
multitier label that is constrained by the ICB requirement. If the ambitious segment
is smaller than the uncertified segment but costs are sufficiently different, then the basic
standard is sB 5 sBp – (NA/2vB); otherwise the industry offers a multitier label that
is constrained by the ICB requirement.
2.4. Comparing Autarky Labels
In this section, we first compare the nature of the NGO and industry labeling schemes
and then compare each of them to the welfare-maximizing labels. The labeling schemes
differ in terms of the structure of the label, the stringency of standards, and the number
of firms that choose to participate in the certified market.
2.4.1. Comparing NGO and Industry Labels
In terms of label structure, the use of binary labels differs across the two label sponsors.
One notable difference is that the industry never offers a binary label that attracts both
types of firm, as lemma 2 showed. Another difference is that if the size of the certified
market is not too great (N ≤ 2/3), the NGO offers a binary label for a wider range of
parameter values than does the industry.10 For example, comparing figures 4 and 6 re-
veals that when N 5 1/2 the NGO often prefers a binary standard when low-cost
firms have a large market share, but the industry never does. Similarly, comparing fig-
ures 5 and 7 shows that when N 5 2/3 the NGO always prefers a binary standard
when NA/N > 1/2 but the industry only does when in addition vA/vB < ΘMT2I .
In terms of stringency, the NGO’s single ambitious standard is always higher than
the industry’s ambitious standard when sAN 5 s
A
E . Moreover, if the industry is not con-10. However, when the certified market becomes very large (N > 2/3), the comparison is
ambiguous. On one hand, the NGO offers a binary label while the industry offers a multitier
label if the cost advantage of the low-cost firms is small (vA/vB > ΘMT2I ). On the other hand,
the industry offers a binary label while the NGO offers a multitier label if the cost advantage of
the low-cost firms is great (vA/vB < ΘMT2I ) and low-cost firms are less than half of the certified
market (NA < N/2).
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 481strained, then the NGO’s ambitious standard is higher than the industry’s. However,
the following lemma shows that under some conditions the industry can set a higher
ambitious standard.
Lemma 3: The industry may set a more stringent ambitious standard than the
NGO.
Proof: This possibility occurs when both organizations want a multitier standard




p . Since the stringency of the ICB constraint in-





E) 5 (1 – N)/2v
B > 0. Such an outcome is also possible when the
NGO sets a basic standard and λICB/(2NAvA) > sBE – s
A
p . Consider the case where
sBE 5 s
A
p , so the NGO is indifferent between the basic and multitier standard. If the
ICB constraint is binding, then the industry will set an ambitious standard above sAp .
QED
Thus, as the cost differences get small, the NGO may set a lower ambitious stan-
dard than the industry, in order to maintain a higher basic standard, while industry sets
a higher ambitious standard in order to keep its basic standard low. This possibility can
be observed in figures 4 and 6 for the case when N 5 :5. The borderline between the
basic and multitier standards for the NGO lies within the region of constrained
multitier standards for the industry, and close to this borderline the NGO’s ambitious
standard is weaker than that of the industry.
In addition, the industry may set a more stringent standard for the high-cost firms
than does the NGO. In particular, there are parameter values for which the NGO sets
an ambitious binary label (which implicitly sets sBN 5 0) but the industry sets a multi-
tiered label with sBI > 0.
In terms of participation, the industry tends to attract a greater number of firms to
participate in labeling than does the NGO. This occurs for any parameter values that
lead the NGO to set a binary standard but lead the industry to set a multitier stan-
dard. However, as the following lemma shows, the opposite is also possible.
Lemma 4: The NGO may attract more participation than the industry if the total
certified market size is large enough.
Proof: The industry always garners as much or more participation except in the case
where the industry wants a single ambitious label, while the NGO prefers a mul-
titier label. The industry has a single ambitious label when NA > 1 – N and
vA/vB < 1/2 or vA/vB < ΘMT2I . The NGO sets a multitier or single basic label
if NA < N/2 or vA/vB > ΘBinaryN . These two situations can thus occur if N/2 >
NA > 1 – N, which requires N > 2/3. By proposition 2, the NGO will not set
482 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019a single basic standard in this range, but rather the multitier standard. Thus, when
N > 2/3 and vA/vB < max½12 ,ΘMT2I , the NGO has full participation and sepa-
rate standards, while the industry only certifies the low-cost firms. QED
When the certified market is large and low-cost firms have both a large cost advan-
tage and a large market share, the industry may prefer to set a single ambitious standard
that yields a high price. TheNGOwould introduce more competition into the certified
market and would offer a multitier label instead. Thus, there exist situations in which
the NGO will attract more participation than the industry in autarky.
2.4.2. Implementing the Welfare Optimum
Finally, it is instructive to compare each of the sponsored schemes to the welfare-
optimal set of standards. The most striking aspect of this comparison is that the indus-
try association never implements the welfare-maximizing label structure. In sharp con-
trast, the NGO implements the welfare maximum under a wide range of parameter
values. Both the NGO outcome and welfare optimum utilize the three possibilities
of a single basic standard of {sBE, s
B
E}, a single ambitious standard of (s
A
E , 0), and a




E); however, in some circumstances the welfare maxi-
mum calls for an intermediate multitier standard that is less stringent for the high-cost
firms and more stringent for the low-cost firms. As a result, the parameter values for
which the NGO chooses each label structure will not correspond exactly to the condi-
tions for the welfare maximum. Nevertheless, a comparison of figures 2 and 4 shows
that the NGO implements the welfare optimum in many cases. For example, when
low-cost firms have a large enough share of the certified market, the NGO implements
the socially optimal single ambitious standard. Similarly, when high-cost firms have a
large enough share of the certified market but have a large cost disadvantage, the NGO
implements the socially optimal multitier standard. Moreover, when high-cost firms
have a large enough share of the certified market but have only a small cost disadvan-
tage, the NGO implements the socially optimal single basic standard. Overall, there is
considerable qualitative similarity between theNGO and the welfare-maximizing stan-
dards, in contrast to the industry optimum. We note this point in the following prop-
osition.
Proposition 4: The industry never implements the welfare maximum. The NGO
implements the welfare-maximizing set of standards when (a) low-cost firms have a
large enough share of the certified market and have a relatively large cost advantage,
(b) high-cost firms have a large enough share of the certified market but have a rel-
atively large cost disadvantage, or (c) cost differentials are sufficiently small.
Proof: From previous propositions 1 and 2, when vA/vB < min½ΘICA,ΘMT1W  and

























A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 483vA/vB < min½ΘBinaryW ,ΘBinaryN  and NA > NAW ,11 both the planner and the NGO
implement (sAE , 0). When N < 2/3, N
A/N < 1/2 and vA/vB > ΘICA, or when
N < 2/3, NA/N > 1/2 and vA/vB > ΘBinaryN , if the planner wishes to implement
(sBE, s
B
E), the NGO does as well. QED3. LABEL COMPETITION
We turn now to the equilibrium of label competition.12 The fact that the NGO and
the industry association have not only different preferences but also different situa-
tions in which they would not offer a second label in autarky leaves room for label
competition. Appendix B (available online) analyzes the case where labels are restricted
to be binary. It shows that label competition can be beneficial for the environment when
there is a large number of high-cost firms and they are at a significant cost disadvan-
tage. As shown in the previous section, this is a situation in which a multitier standard
is valuable, so if firms are for some reason constrained to offer only binary labels, com-
petition can improve environmental outcomes.
Here we focus on the case when both label sponsors are able to offer multitier stan-
dards. Given the complexity of the results for the autarky cases, one might expect




1 1 2N – N2/2
p
– 1)/N > 1/2 ifffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
11 2N –N2/2)2 > (N/21 1)2, which holds since (21 4N –N2)/2 – (N21 4N1 4)/45
1 – N3/4) > 0.
12. Appendix B analyzes the case in which the two organizations compete subject to the
straint that each can offer only a binary ecolabel. This allows us to compare our results with
se of Fischer and Lyon (2014), who study competition between binary labels under a differ-
set of assumptions. The earlier paper differs from this one in two important ways. First, the
vious paper used a representative consumer framework for the demand side of the model,
ile the present paper uses a vertical-differentiation framework based on heterogeneous con-
ers, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). Second, the previous paper had a continuum of firms
h varying costs of compliance, while the present paper has two types of firms differentiated
their cost of compliance. Despite the differences in assumptions, the basic results for binary
el competition are qualitatively similar. First, there are two types of equilibria, a normal one
hich the NGO offers a more ambitious standard than does the industry, and a reverse equi-
ium in which the industry offers the more ambitious standard. Second, label competition
etimes offers better environmental performance than NGO autarky, especially if there is
rge cost gap between high-cost and low-cost firms and there is a large number of high-cost
s. Under these conditions, a standard-setting entity faces a stark trade-off between extract-
substantial improvements from low-cost firms and inducing participation by high-cost firms.
ause it is impossible to accomplish both goals at once, label competition may be beneficial by
ting a separate standard for each group of firms. An important difference between the two
lyses, however, is that in the earlier paper, a normal equilibrium always exists, while in
present paper its existence depends upon parameter values.
484 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019the opposite turns out to be the case. Unlike autarky, where each organization’s labeling
scheme depends upon details of the parameters, we are able to show the striking result
that under multitier label competition there is a single perfect equilibrium regardless of
parameter values. Intuition might suggest that the industry association would be able to
drive out the NGO label by setting standards that offer higher profits for both types of
firms, but this turns out not to be the case.
Proposition 5: Under multitier label competition, the unique trembling-hand per-
fect equilibrium involves each player offering a multitier label of the form (sAp , sBp).
Proof: See appendix A. QED
Proposition 5 provides the remarkable result that there is a unique equilibrium pair
of standards under label competition, with each sponsor offering a multitier label, each
tier of which maximizes profits for one industry segment or the other. With multitier
label competition between an NGO and industry association, the only outcome that
satisfies trembling-hand perfection is identical multitier labels set at the same levels
as if there were two separate industry groups, one for each type of firm! This outcome
is illustrated in figure 8.Figure 8. Unique equilibrium in multitier competition
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 485This result is surely counterintuitive at first blush, at least for readers familiar with
the certification industry. The fact that the equilibrium is driven almost entirely by in-
dustry profit-maximization considerations, rather than environmental protection,
seems to run counter to casual empirical evidence that NGOs set tough standards that
go beyond what industry prefers. However, the logic is clear and has two distinct com-
ponents. First, the industry always sets its ambitious standard at the profit-maximizing
level for the low-cost firms so it is impossible for the NGO to induce these firms to
adopt any more stringent label. Second, the industry prefers to distort downward
the basic standard in order to increase overall industry profits, a result familiar from
the vertical differentiation literature (Shaked and Sutton 1982). Thus, competition
from the NGO can raise the basic standard and improve environmental performance
and it is impossible for the industry to induce these firms to adopt a weaker standard. In
effect, the NGO sets a minimum quality standard that reduces the excessive product
differentiation desired by the industry.13 The fact that each sponsor offers a multitier
label is then simply a response to the possibility of trembles by the other player. We
discuss the implications of this result further in section 6.
4. PARETO-IMPROVING COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS
To this point we have focused solely on noncooperative solutions to the ecolabel game.
Here we explore whether there may be cooperative outcomes that would be preferred
by both players to the multitier equilibrium.
The question is whether there exists a sAC ≠ s
A











p , sBp). Consider an adjustment that holds
environmental benefits constant: NAsAp 1 (N – NA)sBp 5 NAsAC 1 (N – N
A)sBC.
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and13. This result is similar to the analysis of minimum quality standards in Ronnen (1991).












Because we have held environmental benefits constant, we know that sBC < s
B
p.
Therefore, there is room to raise total profits without lessening environmental
gains (and vice versa). Both parties can do better by coordinating than engaging in a
noncooperative multitier equilibrium. The result is more product differentiation than
would occur in the noncooperative equilibrium and more environmental effort by the
low-cost firms. We leave the details of a cooperative analysis for future research.
5. ENTRY
Suppose the number of firms in the certified market is not fixed, but rather determined
by an entry decision that occurs after standards have been set. Suppose firmsmust incur
a cost F to enter the certifiedmarket (e.g., the cost of an initial audit to ensure they meet
the label’s standards); they then find out what type of firm they are. With probability
a they will have cost vA and with probability (1 – a) they will have cost vB > vA. A
firm will enter the market if its expected operating profits (apAA 1 (1 – a)pBB) ex-
ceed the entry costs; in other words, entry will occur until average operating profits
equal F.
Since profits for low-cost firms certifying to the ambitious standard are always
weakly higher than those of high-cost firms,14 and thus strictly positive, the low-cost
firms will always participate in their label after entering, assuming the standard satisfies
the incentive compatibility conditions. But we must allow for the possibility that, after
entry, not all high-cost firms will participate. Let β be the share of the available (1 – a)N
type B firms that, having entered, participate in the basic standard. Note that β 5 1
when pBB > 0 and when 0 < β < 1, pBB 5 0. The entry decision thus remains
apAA 1 (1 – a)pBB ≥ F, but the equilibrium participation level is affected.
5.1. Entry Levels with Different Types of Standards
We begin our analysis by characterizing the extent of entry depending upon the struc-
ture of the labels that are offered in equilibrium.
5.1.1. Single Basic Standard
If only a single basic label (SB) is offered, then high-cost firms are not shut out from
the market and entry will occur as long as pB – avA(sB)2 – (1 – a)vB(sB)2 ≥ F. Since
pB 5 sB(1 – (a 1 β(1 – a))N), in equilibrium, entry will lead to a total number of
entrants14. Otherwise they could defect to the weaker standard, where by definition they have higher
profits than the high-cost firms; i.e., maxfpAA, pABg > pBB ≥ 0.
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sB(1 – sBv) – F
sB(a 1 β(1 – a))
,
where v 5 avA 1 (1 – a)vB. Given this amount of entry the price is pBSB 5 v(s
B)2 1
F. Operating profits for type B firms in this equilibrium are then F – a(vB – vA)(sB)2
(regardless of β). Thus, to sustain participation by any type B firms (i.e., for pBB ≥ 0),
we must have F ≥ a(vB – vA)(sB)2. This condition essentially places an upper bound
on sB being consistent with a single basic label equilibrium. If the inequality is strict,
then all firms that have entered will participate (β 5 1).
Note that the numerator of NSB is maximized at sB 5 1/(2v), when it becomes
1/(4v) – F. Thus, if F > 1/(4v) then there is no entry to the single basic standard.
5.1.2. Single Ambitious Standard
In the case of a single ambitious standard (SA), which can only be met by low-cost
firms, then pASA 5 s
A½1 – aN and pASA 5 sA½1 – aN – vA(sA)2. Since entry occurs
until apA 5 F, we obtain
NSA 5
sA(1 – sAvA) – F/a
sAa
:
Operating profits for type A firms are then pASA 5 F/a. Of course, demand limits the
maximum possible operating profits. In the limit as N→ 0, the operating profits of a
single entrant would be maximized at sA 5 1/(2vA) and would be equal to pASA 5
1/(4vA). Thus, the single ambitious label cannot be supported if F > a/(4vA) because
no entry will occur.
5.1.3. Multitier Standards
In the case of multitier basic and ambitious labels (M), prices are differentiated by
type, and equilibrium operating profits must be nonnegative for both types. Thus,
the relevant prices are pB 5 sB(1 – (a 1 β(1 – a))N), and pA 5 sA(1 – aN) –
sBβ(1 – a)N. Substituting in our expressions, the expected profits will equal the entry
costs when
NM 5
s – c – F
as 1 β(1 – a)sB
, (6)
where s 5 asA 1 (1 – a)sB is the average standard and c 5 (avA(sA)2 1 (1 –
a)vB(sB)2) is the average compliance cost.
For the separating equilibrium, we can define a minimum and maximum entry fee
that allows for an interior solution. First, from the expression for NM, we see imme-
diately that if F > FMmax ≡ s – c, there will be no entry and no certified market; this
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that is, if F ≤ asA(sBvB – sAvA) < FMmax, then excess entry to access the ambitious
standard (because the profits are high enough and the probability of being an ambi-
tious type high enough) can create excess supply of the basic standard, leading to
β 5 0.15 In the subsequent analysis, for simplicity we will focus on equilibria where
β 5 1.
Because entry is endogenous, reference points such as sAp and sAE depend onN, which
in turn depends on the standards themselves. Thus, to be fully explicit we could write
sAp (NSA(sAp )) 5 (1 – aNSA(sAp ))/2vA where the subscript SA indicates that we are
considering the single ambitious label, which offers the greatest profits for type A firms.
Similarly, we could write sAE (NSA(s
A
E )) 5 (1 – aNSA(s
A
E ))/v
A to indicate the highest
standard that is consistent with the individual rationality constraint for the type A
firms with a single ambitious label. To economize on notation, however, we will sup-
press this dependence below and simply write sAp and sAE . A key tool in the analysis is




a(1 – 2vAsA – aNM)






(1 – a) 1 – 2vBsB – (a 1 1)NM
 
a2sA 1 (1 – a2)sB
: (8)15. In this case, equilibrium requires that only β(1 – a)N firms participate in the basic stan-
dard, since otherwise operating profits would be negative. Hence, for β ∈ (0, 1), we require
sB(1 – (a 1 β(1 – a))N) 5 vB(sB)2, so that the operating profits of type B firms are just zero.
Simplifying, we obtain
β 5
1 – vBsB – aN
N(1 – a)
:
Substituting in for NM yields





  F – asA(sBvB – sAvA)
a(sA(1 – sAvA) – sB(1 – sBvB)) – F
:
Note that the denominator of this expression is positive when F < FMBmax ≡ a(sA(1 – sAvA) –
sB(1 – sBvB)) < FMmax. Next, from the numerator we see that if F ≤ asA(sBvB – sAvA) < FMBmax,
then β 5 0. In this situation, the cost differences are high enough and the fixed costs low enough
that entry by ambitious firms drives the high-cost firms out of the certified market. Note that this
is only possible if the basic standard is sufficiently high.
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2 < 0, and a sufficient condition for
∂2NM/∂(sB)
2 < 0 is ∂NM/∂sBjsB50 ≥ 0.16
Analytical solutions to the autarky multitier standards in the presence of entry
are too complex to derive usefully, although it is possible to characterize the outcomes
and to conduct numerical explorations. Because our key result is the equilibrium of
multitier competition, however, we focus on that in the remainder of the section.
5.2. Multitier Competition with Entry
The NGO’s objective function is to maximize environmental gains, just as in prior sec-
tions. The industry trade association’s objective requires a bit more consideration. One
possibility would be for the industry association to maximize aggregate profits of firms
net of the entry cost, but because net profits are always zero with entry, this would yield
indeterminate results. Alternatively, the industry association could maximize total op-
erating profits (i.e., contribution to fixed costs) of all member firms (i.e., those that have
entered), Np, or equivalently the total industry profits including the revenues of the
certifiers, in which case F is merely a transfer. Because average operating profits per firm
in equilibrium always equal F, maximizing member profits is tantamount to maximiz-
ing NF, or simply maximizing N. This approach yields determinate results and is the
one we adopt here.
With entry, the industry still wants to maximize average profits, now in equilibrium
as a way to maximize participation. Maximizing participation is achieved by setting
(7) and (8) to zero, which yields sA 5 sAp 5 (1 – aNM)/(2vA) and sB 5 (1 –
(1 1 a)NM)/(2vB) 5 sBp – aNM/(2vB), just as in the earlier industry autarky analy-
sis. Thus, the industry still wants to offer the profit-maximizing standard to the am-
bitious firms and would prefer a standard below the profit-maximizing standard for
the basic firms. The NGO, however, wants to maximize total environmental gains
and will not allow the basic standard to fall below the profit-maximizing standard
for the type B firms.
Let ~s 5 a2sA 1 (1 – a2)sB 5 as 1 (1 – a)sB. At sB 5 sBp 5 (1 – NM)/(2vB)




2a(sB(1 – a)a2 1 Fa3 1 (sB)2((1 – a2)2vA 1 (1 – a)a3vB))
a2sA 1 (1 – a2)sB





(1 – a)(F(1 1 a) 1 (sA)2a(1 1 a)vA – (sB)2(1 – a2)vB – sAa(1 1 2sBavB))
a2sA 1 (1 – a2)sB
 3 ,
which is negative if F ≥ asA(½1/(1 1 a) – sAvA).
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dition with respect to sB is (1 – a)NM 1 s∂NM/∂sB 5 0, or ∂NM/∂sB 5 –(1 –
a)NM/s. It is easy to see that (1 – a)NMa/~s < (1 – a)NM/s, so ∂NM/∂sBjsB5sBp >
–(1 – a)NM/s, meaning sBp is lower than the NGO would prefer. Therefore, the
NGO would like a higher basic standard and the industry would like a lower one,
and the best either can do to counter the other is to offer sBp. This gives us the same
equilibrium strategy as without entry, which we record in the following proposition.
Proposition 6: With free entry, the competitive equilibrium with multitier stan-
dards is (sAp , sBp).
Of course, the exact value of these standards depends upon the entry condition (6),
itself a function of a and F. The equilibrium solution yields:17
sA 5

















where X 5 (1 1 a – 2a2)vA 1 a3vB > 0 and Z 5 vA(4FvBX – (1 – a)2a(vB 1
a(vB – vA))). Thus, the result of proposition 5 continues to hold, but with sAp and
sBp defined not by an exogenous N, but by F and a.
6. DISCUSSION
Our model yields a rich set of testable predictions, along with some normative impli-
cations. We first analyzed the labeling strategies of NGO and industry label sponsors
in autarky and showed that they differ substantially. First, the NGO sets more strin-
gent binary standards than does the industry. Second, the industry prefers multitier
labels in a wider range of situations than does the NGO. Third, the industry never sets
a binary standard that can be met by all firms, but the NGO does so when the cost
differential between firms is narrow and there are roughly the same number of high-
cost and low-cost firms. Importantly, the industry never implements the welfare-optimal
standard, but the NGO does so under quite a wide range of industry conditions. We
then turned to label competition and showed that the equilibrium of multitier label com-
petition takes a unique, robust form that is largely determined by industry preferences;17. Calculations performed in Mathematica.
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than would the NGO alone. Finally, we showed that there is room for cooperative agree-
ments between NGO and industry sponsors that can simultaneously raise profits and
improve environmental gains, relative to the competitive equilibrium. In this section, we
discuss how these results map onto stylized facts about label competition.
As described by Conroy (2007) and modeled by Baron (2011), many certification
systems sprang from campaigns by NGOs that attacked existing corporate practices
and demanded higher standards. As first movers, these NGOs possessed market power
in setting standards, as described by our analysis of NGO autarky. As our analysis of
label competition demonstrates, however, these first movers lose considerable market
power when confronted with entry by industry associations. Thus, theoretical models
of ecolabels that ignore the role of competition are likely to provide quite an unrealistic
picture that exaggerates the power of certification to shift markets.
An interesting possibility is that current outcomes in the ecolabel market are not
consistent with being in a long-run equilibrium. In fact, it turns out that there are good
reasons to suspect that the current ecolabel market is not in long-run equilibrium. Ac-
cording to www.ecolabelindex.com, the number of ecolabels on offer has grown sharply
over time, with 444 currently available in 197 countries and 25 industry sectors. Many
commentators have decried this proliferation of labels, fearing that it leads to consumer
confusion and a loss of faith in the whole ecolabeling enterprise. For example, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has held a series of
meetings devoted to exploring solutions to the problems created by ecolabel prolifera-
tion.18 Many observers have predicted that there will ultimately be consolidation in
the ecolabel industry, just as there often is in other industries, but they have been at
a loss to predict the form of the industry shakeout.19 One reason that consolidation
and equilibrium seem to be so slow in the ecolabel industry is that many label sponsors
are nonprofits, whose motivations may lie more in maintaining their position in the
market rather than seeking out profitable or efficient outcomes. Interestingly, the re-
cent announcement of a merger between two major ecolabels, those of Rainforest Al-
liance and UTZ, may signal that a new phase of consolidation has begun (Kaye 2017).
Although our analysis is not explicitly dynamic, it provides some intriguing indica-
tions of how the ecolabel market may evolve over time. As shown in propositions 5 and
6, the unique multitier equilibrium in our model involves two standards, each set at the18. The OECD has also commissioned a series of white papers on ecolabel proliferation
(Gruère 2013; Lyon 2014).
19. Heyes and Martin (2016) offer an interesting model in which ecolabels are differentiated
both horizontally and vertically, which allows them to address the question of the equilibrium
number of labels. Each label is binary and occupies a unique horizontal niche, however, so the
issue of multitier competition does not arise in their model.
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driven outcomes, the only wrinkle being that there is somewhat more intense label
competition than would be profit maximizing for the industry as a whole. We also
showed that a cooperative arrangement can be Pareto improving, suggesting that con-
solidation and multi-stakeholder governance structures are likely to be part of any ul-
timate equilibrium. Interestingly, the apparel industry appears to have already evolved
from a situation dominated by NGO labels to one dominated by business-led labels
(Marques 2013). Concerns about sweatshop labor in the apparel industry were initially
voiced in 1989 by an activist NGO, Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). Over time, more
and more organizations, both nonprofit and industry-driven, entered the space, to the
point that by 2005 the CCC was stating publicly its concern that there were “too many
multi-stakeholder initiatives” (Marques 2013, 26). In 2007, the Global Social Compli-
ance Program (GSCP) was launched in an effort to harmonize the growing set of stan-
dards, and in 2013 Wal-Mart’s Sustainability Consortium launched a Clothing, Tex-
tiles, and Footwear working group to help drive convergence across standards in a way
that was consistent with Wal-Mart’s goals, which can be assumed to be largely market
driven.
There are signs of movement toward greater business domination within the realm
of sustainability labels, as well. The USGreen Building Council’s Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design (LEED), which offers certified, silver, gold, and platinum
tiers, long held a monopoly position in building certification. It has attracted competi-
tion from the Green Globes certification scheme, an industry-led alternative that offers
faster and less expensive certification than LEED (Alter 2013) and that is supported
by US timber companies because it does not require FSC certification for lumber used
in construction (Bach 2013). Green Globes is also a multitiered certification scheme,
offering from one to four “globes” to participating buildings. A detailed comparison be-
tween the two systems is provided by Smith et al. (2006). Within the timber sector,
there was some early evidence that the standards of the FSC and the SFI were grad-
ually converging, as FSC became more market friendly and SFI attempted to incorpo-
rate more conservation concerns (Cashore et al. 2004). More current work suggests that
the standards of both sponsors have been tightening over time, perhaps due to changes
in preferences among consumers (Judge-Lord et al. 2015). Consistent with the predic-
tions of our analysis, recent changes in the SFI label have essentially rendered it a multi-
tier label by allowing users to specify any desired percentage of certified content they
choose. In the coffee sector, there appears to be convergence among multiple different
labels in terms of core criteria, but with some level of differentiation remaining as labels
go after consumer groups with differing preferences (Reinecke et al. 2012).
Although it would be premature to claim that labeling schemes for any of these sec-
tors have reached equilibrium, our results suggest that a plausible long-run outcome
will be convergence toward business-led harmonized certification schemes, perhaps ul-
A Theory of Multitier Ecolabel Competition Fischer and Lyon 493timately followed by a cooperative bargaining process that results in a single multi-
stakeholder label.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed the first theoretical model of competing multitier ecolabels. This is
an important theoretical step, because although the literature has focused on labels that
are binary in structure, some prominent labels, such as the US Green Building Coun-
cil’s LEED certification, have multiple tiers instead and all labels could potentially
choose to have multiple tiers. We present a theory explaining how standard-setting or-
ganizations choose between these two forms and compare the differing incentives of
industry trade associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in setting
standards. We show that for either type of organization in autarky, multitier labels
are more attractive when the number of low-cost producers is small and the cost gap
between low-cost and high-cost firms is large. We show that the NGO operating in
autarky implements the welfare-maximizing outcome for some, but not all, parameter
values; the industry never does. When competition occurs using multitier labels there
exists a unique equilibrium pair of standards, even with endogenous entry by produc-
ers, and competition always provides less environmental protection than would the
NGO in autarky. Our results suggest that competition between ecolabels may involve
mergers or cooperation between NGO and industry labels but that in equilibrium the
standards reflected in these labels will be dominated by considerations of profitability as
opposed to environmental protection.APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1
A social planner would choose sA and sB < sA to maximize welfareW 5 CS 1 G 1 P
subject to the ICA constraint (assigned the shadow value λICA), the ICB constraint (as-
signed the shadow value λICB), and the IRB constraint that the basic standard cannot
exceed sEB (shadow value gIRB). The Lagrangian associated with the planner’s problem
is thus
L 5 ((NB (2 – N – NA))/2)sB 1 ((NA(2 – NA))/2)sA – NAvA(sA)2
– NBvB(sB)2 1 NAsA 1 NBsB 1 λICA((1 – N
A)/vA – sB – sA)
1 λICB(s
B – (1 – NA)/vB 1 sA) 1 λIRB((1 – N)/v
B – sB):
The first-order conditions yield
sA 5 (4 – NA)/(4vA) 1 (λICB – λICA)/(2N
AvA) (A1)
and
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BvB): (A2)
If λICA 5 0, then sA ≥ (4 – NA)/4vA. However, if the ICA constraint is to be met
(even when it is least binding at sB 5 0), we must have sA ≤ (1 – NA)/vA. For both







This is never true, so the ICA constraint must be binding and λICA > 0, implying we
have sA 5 sAE – s
B. Moreover, by lemma 1, the fact that the ICA constraint binds im-
plies that the ICB constraint is not binding and λICB 5 0. Because λICB 5 0 and the
















One potential equilibrium occurs when gIRB 5 0, which implies sB < sBE 5

















3(NA)2vBNB 1 (4 – N – NA)vANANB
2Nv
:
A special case of this type of equilibrium occurs when sB ≤ 0, in which case the stan-
dard is {sAE , 0}.
If gIRB > 0, so that sB 5 sBE 5 (1 – N)/v
B, then
sB 5














Thus, another special case is sA 5 sAE – s
B and sB 5 sBE.




E this would imply s
A < sB, so in this case all firms certify to
sBE 5 (1 – N)/v
B. This occurs if (1 – NA)/vA < 2(1 – N)/vB, or vA/vB > (1 – NA)/
(2(1 – N)). Thus the three possible types of equilibria are (a) {sAE – s
B, sB}, (b) {sAE , 0},
or (c) {sBE, s
B
E}.
Since there are only three types of equilibrium outcomes, we can characterize pre-
cisely the parameter values for which each type emerges. In the interior case of {sAE – s
B,
sB} with sB ∈ (0, sBE), welfare is
W(sAE , s
B) 5
NA(1 – NA)(2 1 NA)
2vA
1




– (NAvA 1 NBvB) sB
 2
:
The welfare-maximizing basic standard is then
sBW 5
N(4 – N) – 2NA(2 1 NA)
4Nv
:
This will violate the constraint that sB ≥ 0 when N(4 – N) < 2NA(2 1 NA). The
quadratic formula shows that this is equivalent to
NA > NAW ≡ –1 1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi




If N 5 1/2, this implies NAW 5 :3693 and N
A
W/N ≥ :7386. If N 5 2/3, we get
NAW 5 :45297 and N
A
W/N ≥ :679455. For values of N
A/N greater than this thresh-
old, an interior solution does not exist.
The expression for sBW will violate the constraint s




3N2 – 2NA(NA – 2N)
4NA(1 – N)
:














multitier standard is infeasible, but the single basic standard {sBE, s
B
E} is still available.
When vA/vB > ΘMT1W , the interior solution is feasible, but it may be optimal to relax
the ICA constraint and implement (sBE, s
B
E) instead. This occurs if v
A/vB > ΘMT2W , where













E , 0) are feasible, it is necessary to directly
compare welfare under the two standards. Some calculations show that W(sBE, s
B
E) >
W(sAE , 0) if



















and equality obtains at vA/vB 5 ΘBinaryW . QED
Proof of Proposition 2
From the NGO’s perspective, the multitier standard dominates the single ambitious




AsAE , or simply when N
A < N/2. Thus,
when the low-cost firms have more than half of the labeled market share, the NGO
does not wish to water down the ambitious standard to accommodate a positive basic
standard.











E. Note that this is equivalent to s
A
p > sBE. As in the welfare
maximization, this means that the cost gap between the two types of firms must be suf-
ficiently large, that is
vA/vB < ΘICA 5 (1 – N
A)/2(1 – N): (A3)
Note that ΘICA ≥ 1/2 because NA ≤ N, and that ΘICA ≥ 1 when N ≥ (1 1 NA)/2.
In this latter case, with the basic standard at sBE the NGO can always find a higher stan-
dard that the low-cost firms will accept.20








Thus, when the low-cost firms have more than half of the certified market, and the
cost gap is large enough, the single ambitious standard dominates both the multitier
and the single basic standard. Note that ΘBinaryN 5 ΘICA when N
A/N 5 1/2, and
ΘBinaryN > ΘICA when N
A/N > 1/2. Moreover, ΘBinaryN ≥ 1 when N
A/N ≥ 1/2 and
N ≥ 2/3.21 Since sBE > s
A
p was the condition for the basic standard to dominate the20. Note that when N > 1/2, the right-hand side of (A3) is greater than unity for small
values of NA which means that the multitier standard is preferred to the single basic standard
regardless of the cost gap when the number of low-cost firms is small enough.
21. Note that ΘBinaryN is concave inN
A, is equal to unity atNA 5 N and NA 5 1 – N, and
is strictly greater than unity forNA between 1 – N andN. Thus, ifN > 1 – N, i.e., ifN > 1/2,
then for all NA > 1 – N, ΘBinaryN > 1 and thus v
A/vB < ΘBinaryN . When N > 2/3, N
A >
1/3 5 N/2 implies ΘBinaryN > 1. (Since N
A ≤ N, there are two cases to consider. If N <
1 – N, i.e., if N < 1/2, then ΘBinaryN rises monotonically in N
A reaching a maximum of unity
when NA 5 N. On the other hand, if N > 1 – N, i.e., if N > 1/2, then as NA increases from
zero, ΘBinaryN rises monotonically from zero to unity at N
A 5 1 – N and remains greater than
unity for all NA ∈ (1 – N,N). In this case, vA/vB < NA(1 – NA)/(N(1 – N)) for all
NA > 1 – N.)
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A
p is a necessary condition to warrant a single basic standard.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3
The industry’s problem is to maximize the Lagrangian consisting of the industry ob-
jective function plus the two relevant constraints: the ICB constraint (assigned the








sB(1 – N) – vB sB
 2 
– λICB((1 – N
A)/vB – sA – sB) 1 fsB:


















Consider first the case where the ICB constraint is not binding, so λICB 5 0. Then
the basic standard is set lower than would be profit-maximizing just for the high-cost
firms, because raising it lowers prices for the low-cost types. Let us define the basic





IfNA < 1 – N (i.e., if the type A market share is smaller than the share of consumers
not purchasing a certified product), sBInt > 0. However, if N
A > 1 – N, then sBp –
NA/2vB < 0 which means that f > 0, and sB 5 0.
Now, consider the case where the incentive compatibility constraint is binding for




p, we know now that in
all cases the industry wants to hold the high-cost firms to a lower standard than would
maximize their individual type profits.
Next, we analyze the conditions under which the ICB constraint binds. To solve
for the shadow value of the constraint, we set the optimal basic standard equal to the
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We noted above that if NA < 1 – N, then the industry offers the high-cost firms a








In this case, inequality (A5) simply determines whether or not the multitiered stan-
dard adds the shadow value of the ICB constraint to the interior solution.
However, if NA > 1 – N, then sBInt < 0, and the constraint that s
B ≥ 0 will bind if
the shadow value λICB is not large enough on its own. In this case, as with the binary
standard problem, as long as f > 0, the industry chooses max½sAp , sAx . To explore this




p ) 5 (1 – N








We see immediately that if the ambitious firms have very low relative costs
(vA/vB < 1/2), then sBICB < 0 and the constraint that s
B ≥ 0 is the only one binding;
in this case, the industry chooses a single standard of sAp . On the other hand, if the
costs of the two firm types are more similar (vA/vB > 1/2), then the ICB constraint
binds; however, the constraint that sB ≥ 0 may also bind. Even with a positive λICB,
the industry may still want a negative sB to create more separation between the stan-
dards; if it is constrained from doing so, it will choose instead to raise sA alone to meet
the ICB requirement, before offering multitiered standards. In this case, the industry
chooses sAx .
Finally, as the ICB constraint becomes more binding and the shadow value λICB
rises, we arrive again in the region where sB > 0, so f 5 0, and we have the multitier
solution {sAI , s
B
ICB}. To solve for this border, we set s
A
x 5 sAI , evaluated at the equilib-
rium value of λICB; that is,




N(1 – 2NA 1 N)
2(NAvA 1 NBvB)
:








Note that ΘMT2I > Θ
multi
I only when N
A > 1 – N. QED
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Proposition 3 shows that the industry in autarky always sets sA ≥ sAp , with the equality
holding unless either the IRB or the ICB constraint is binding. When the IRB binds,
the industry prefers to set (sAx (0), 0). However, the NGO’s best response is then to set
sB > 0, in which case the IRB constraint no longer binds. When the ICB constraint
binds, this is because the industry is distorting sB downward to inflate profits for the
low-cost firms. However, the NGO’s best response is to offer sB ≥ sBp, which is more
attractive to the type B firms and also offers more abatement. Thus neither the IRB
nor the ICB constraints will bind in competitive equilibrium, and hence the industry
will set in equilibrium set sA 5 sAp . Since sAp maximizes the profits of the low-cost
firms, the industry will always undercut the NGO’s ambitious standard with sAp , and
the NGO will not be able to attract the low-cost firms away; if the NGO offers an
ambitious standard, sAp is the best it can do.
Proposition 3 also shows that the industry in autarky always sets sB < sBp to main-
tain profits for the low-cost firms. Thus, the NGO can raise the standard for the high-
cost firms to at least sBp, and the industry can do nothing to attract those firms away.
Nor can the NGO go higher than sBp, because then the industry could attract the high-
cost firms away with a lower standard. Furthermore, since sAp is the profit-maximizing
standard for the low-cost firms regardless of sB, even with a higher sB than the industry
would like, the industry has no incentive to further raise sA to differentiate the prod-
ucts.
How the outcome is implemented—that is, exactly which label each sponsor offers—
is more subtle. One possibility is that the two sponsors offer identical multitier labels.
This equilibrium is robust to “trembles” in the sense of Selten (1975). If the industry
makes a small deviation from sI 5 (sAp , sBp) to play (sAp – ε, sBp – m), the NGO’s best re-
sponse for ε > 0 and/or m > 0 is to offer sN 5 (sAp 1 ε, sBp 1 m) and for ε < 0 and/or
m < 0 the NGO’s best response is to offer sN 5 (sAp 1 jεj, sBp 1 jmj). Either way, as
ε→ 0 and m→ 0, the NGO’s best response converges to the equilibrium value.
Similar logic applies for the industry’s best response. If the NGO makes a small
deviation from sI 5 (sAp , sBp) to play (sAp – ε, sBp – m), the industry’s best response
for ε > 0 and/or m > 0 is to offer sN 5 (sAp , sBp – m) and for ε < 0 and/or m < 0
the industry’s best response is to offer sN 5 (sAp , sBp 1 m). Either way, as ε→ 0 and
m→ 0, the industry’s best response converges to the equilibrium value.
An alternative is that the industry offers only the ambitious standard and the
NGO offers the basic standard, but this equilibrium is not robust to trembles. If
the industry makes a small deviation from sI 5 (sAp , 0) to play (sAp – ε, 0), the NGO’s
best response is to offer sN 5 (sAp 1 ε, sBEg). As ε→ 0, the NGO’s best response does
not converge to sN 5 (0, sBp). Similar logic applies for the industry’s best response.
One might also think that it would be an equilibrium for the NGO to set the am-
bitious standard sAp and the industry to set the basic standard sBp, but this also does not
survive the equilibrium refinement of trembling-hand perfection. Suppose the NGO
500 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists May 2019makes a small deviation from playing sN 5 (sAp , 0) to play (sAp 1 ε, 0). The industry’s
best response is to offer sI 5 (sAp , maxf0, sBInt, sBICB). Furthermore, even as ε→ 0, the
industry’s best response remains (sAp , maxf0, sBInt, sBICB) and never converges to (0, sBp).
On the other hand, if the industry makes a small deviation from sI 5 (0, sBp) to play
(0, sBp – ε), the NGO’s best response is to offer sN 5 (sAICA, s
B
p 1 ε). Again, the
NGO’s best response does not converge to (sAp , 0) even as ε→ 0. QEDREFERENCES
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